In the design of resource bounded agents, high-level cognitive activities, such as reasoning, raise important problems related both to the adaptive ability and to the computational complexity of the underlying cognitive processes. To address these problems, we adopt an agent model where emotion and cognition are conceived as two integrated aspects of intelligent behavior and we present affective-emotional mechanisms that support the adaptation to changing environments and a controlled use of resources. These mechanisms produce an attention field that constrains the input to reasoning processes and also regulate the activation period of those processes. Experimental results are presented to illustrate this approach and to evaluate it by comparison with reference results concerning intention reconsideration policies.
INTRODUCTION
Relevant theoretical and experimental work has demonstrated the fundamental role that emotion plays in reasoning and decisionmaking. For example, experimental results reported by Damásio [6] indicate that a selective reduction of emotion is at least as prejudicial for rationality as excessive emotion, and Gray et al. [9] reported neural evidence for a strong highly constrained form of emotion-cognition interaction, with loss of functional specialization, indicating that emotion and higher cognition can be truly integrated. On the other hand, the importance of emotional phenomena in learning and adaptive behavior is also well documented (e.g. [13] ).
A steady progress has been made in creating agents that convey a sense of emotion (e.g. [15, 23] ). However, this evidence of an encompassing role of emotion in cognitive activity remains largely unexplored in cognitive models for intelligent agents [16] .
An aspect of cognitive activity where this can be illustrated concerns the ability to control the reasoning processes, which is typically addressed by resorting to meta-level reasoning [31] . Considering the experimental evidence, emotion-based mechanisms could constitute an interesting alternative. However, two main problems are recognized underlying this emotion-based approach: (i) the tightly intertwined relation between emotion and cognition, which is hardly compatible to patching emotional phenomena as an addition to the cognitive mechanisms of an agent [1] ; (ii) the dynamic and continuous nature of emotional phenomena, which is highly constrained by the classical notion of a discrete emotional state and its assessment via verbal labels [24] .
In our view, to address these issues we must go beyond the classical separation between emotion and cognition and recognize their symbiotic relation. That is, emotion is a result of cognitive activity and cognitive activity is modulated by emotion, in a dynamic process that unfolds through time according to agentenvironment interaction.
Our work explores this view by proposing an approach where emotion and cognition are modeled as two integrated aspects of intelligent behavior. Two models, an emotion model and an agent model compose our framework. In these models, the relation between emotional and cognitive phenomena is expressed in two main ways: by modulating the formation of emotional memories and by regulating the agents' cognitive activity. In this paper we present affective-emotional mechanisms that address this second aspect. These mechanisms enable the adaptation to changing environments and a controlled use of resources by focusing cognitive processes along two perspectives: a spatial perspective that refers to the space of cognitive elements over which processing can occur, and a temporal perspective that refers to the time available for cognitive processing.
A primary contribution of this paper is to show how affectiveemotional mechanisms are able to produce this double-focusing of reasoning processes without the intervention of meta-level reasoning mechanisms.
The paper is organized as follows: in section 2, we present an overview of the emotion model that supports the proposed approach; in section 3, we build upon that foundational framework to present an agent model integrating emotion and cognition; in section 4, we describe the emotional disposition and focusing mechanisms; in section 5, we report experimental results that illustrate the use of those mechanisms in the Tileworld scenario [11] and show their effect on intention reconsideration [25] ; in section 6, we establish comparisons with related work and draw some conclusions and directions for future work.
MODELING EMOTION FOR AUTONOMOUS AGENTS
Although the relationship between emotion, reasoning and decision-making has been an active area of research, few cognitive models take into account this relationship [16] .
Interesting examples are the models proposed by Botelho and Coelho [3] or by Sloman [27] , where emotion is considered at the agent architecture level. However, these models do not address the dynamic and continuous nature of emotional phenomena.
Other models (e.g. [21, 30] ) address this dynamic nature, but maintain an emphasis on discrete sets of emotional labels. As Scherer refers [24] both the dynamic and the continuous aspects are fundamental to understand the relation between emotion and cognition and, from our point of view, both are essential to define cognitive mechanisms able to cope with the adaptive and computational complexity problems.
The Flow Model of Emotion
We adopt a view where emotional phenomena result from the dynamics of cognitive activity. This view is in line with emotional models proposed by some authors (e.g. [5, 24] ). However, a distinctive aspect of the proposed model is the fact that those dynamics are rooted on the dynamics of energy exchange between the agent and the environment. This is possible due to conceiving an agent as an open system that maintains itself in a state far from equilibrium, yet keeping an internally stable overall structure. This kind of systems is known as dissipative structures [12] .
Adopting this view, the agent-environment relation is determined by the relation between the agent's internal potential, its achievement potential, and the agent-environment coupling conductance, the achievement conductance. The achievement potential represents the potential of change that the agent is able to produce in the environment to achieve the intended state-ofaffairs. The achievement conductance represents the degree of the environment's conduciveness or resistance to that change, which can also mean the degree of environment change that is conducive, or not, to the agent intended state-of-affairs. In a dissipative system the achievement potential can be viewed as a force (P) and the achievement conductance as a transport property (C). The behavioral dynamics of an agent can therefore be characterized as a relation corresponding to a flow, called achievement flow (F), which results from the application of potential P over a conductance C. The behavioral forces that arise from this dynamic relation between achievement potential and achievement conductance, expressed as energy flows, generate behavioral dynamics that underlie the cognitive activity of an agent and lead to the change of the agent's emotional state. These forces are described as a vectorial function ED, called emotional disposition, defined as:
As can be seen in figure 1 .a, at a given instant t = τ an emotional disposition vector has a quality, defined by its orientation (or argument) and an intensity defined by its module. That is:
Intensity(ED) ≡ |ED|
Each quadrant of the two dimensional space δP × δF can be directly related to a specific kind of emotional disposition quality [17] as indicated in figure 1.b. As an example, quadrant Q-III (δP < 0 and δF < 0) corresponds to situations where the agent does not have capacity to handle the "adversities", which is typical of fear situations. It is important to note that the emotional tendency associated to each quadrant (joy, anger, fear, sadness) is only indicative of its main nature, since the quality of the emotional disposition is continuous. This is consistent with phenomenological well-known emotion blends.
We will not discuss the aspects related to emotional modeling, however it is important to note that emotional disposition is defined as an action regulatory disposition or tendency, but it does not constitute in itself an emotion. Emotions are considered emergent phenomena that result from agents' cognitive dynamics.
THE AGENT FLOW MODEL
By defining a foundational framework where emotional phenomena result from the dynamics of cognitive activity, the flow model of emotion provides the support for an agent model where the base notions of potential and flow can be rendered concrete and cognitive structure and mechanisms can be defined. We called that model agent flow model. In this section we will present its overall structure.
Agent Cognitive Structure
One of the main ideas underlying the agent flow model is that interactions between cognitive elements occur as forces resulting from the flow of energy, acting as behavioral driving forces and forming the basis of emotional phenomena. On the other hand, there is much experimental and theoretical evidence that biological cognitive activity is based on the composition of basic components (e.g. [8, 14] ). Based on these evidences, potentials and flows are characterized as energetic signals that form cognitive potentials.
Cognitive potentials result both from agent-environment interaction and from agent internal activity. In both cases they express aspects of the environment (internal and external) that the agent is able to discriminate and perceive, such as the qualities "weight" or "color".
Formally, cognitive potentials are modeled as a composition of two types of signals: a base signal ϕ(t) with a specific angular frequency ω = Ω that identifies the discriminated aspect or quality; and a quantitative signal ρ(t) corresponding to the actual value of the discriminated quality, expressed as a frequency shift ∆ω that modulates the base signal ϕ(t). That is:
Through superposition, aggregates of potentials can be formed. These aggregates of potentials, which we call cognitive elements, are the base of the cognitive structure of an agent. Superposition is possible because the base signals that characterize the cognitive potentials are orthogonal among each other, which implies superposition of energy. Therefore a cognitive element σ(t) is defined as a superposition of cognitive potentials. That is:
where N is the number of potentials in the aggregate.
Cognitive elements play different roles in cognitive activity. Three main roles can be identified: observations, motivators, and mediators. Observations are the direct result of perception processes, representing the current environmental situation. Motivators and mediators are formed internally or embedded in agents' structure. Motivators represent intended situations, acting as motivating forces driving agent's behavior. Mediators describe the media that supports action, forming an interface between internal cognitive processing and action. For instance, planning processes produce sequences of mediators that are translated by action processes into concrete action.
Cognitive Space
The base signals that compose potentials and cognitive elements form a signal space underlying the cognitive structure of an agent, which we call a cognitive space. A cognitive space is characterized as a multi-dimensional signal space where each base signal defines a dimension.
Formally, a cognitive space CS K is defined by a set of K orthonormal basis functions Φ = {ϕ i : i = 1, 2, …, K} with K∈ℵ.
Each basis function ϕ i corresponds to a base signal ϕ i (t) with a specific quality ω = Ω i .
Cognitive elements correspond to specific positions in the cognitive space. Since cognitive elements change with time, at successive time instants they occupy different positions, describing trajectories that reflect the behavior of the agent. At some instant t = τ, a cognitive element σ(t) is represented in a cognitive space CS K as a vector σ, defined as:
where the dimensional factors ρ i ∈ ℂ represent the intensity and frequency shift of quality Ω i in the cognitive element.
Besides enabling a concise description of agents' cognitive structure, the cognitive space also enables a concise description of cognitive dynamics as movement of cognitive elements, as will be discussed next.
Cognitive Dynamics
One of the main characteristics of intelligent behavior is the orientation towards the achievement of motivations. These motivations can take various forms according to the cognitive context (e.g. drives, desires), but they all share two fundamental characteristics: (i) they represent an intended situation; (ii) they act as a motivating force driving agent's behavior. A cognitive element that represents an intended situation is called a motivator. On the other hand, an intended situation is relative to a current situation, represented by cognitive elements called observations, which result from inward flows associated to activities like perception.
The differences between observations and motivators produce the main forces underlying agent's cognitive dynamics. The cognitive activity is consequently guided by the maximization of the flows that lead to the reduction of the distance between observations and motivators. For an agent to succeed in reducing that distance, it needs some form of mediation that supports the transformation of the motivating force into applied force to act in order to change the current situation. When a cognitive element plays this role we call it a mediator. The commitment to use a specific mediator in order to attain a certain motivator results in a new element called an achiever, which supports the concrete action that leads to the change of the current situation and to the corresponding movement of the observations in the cognitive space, as illustrated in figure 2.a. As we can observe in figure 2 .a, the direction of the observation's movement may not be the exact direction towards the motivator.
Besides that, the velocity of the movement can also change during the achievement process. Even if the achiever is aligned with the motivator, the dynamics of the environment (either internal or external) can influence the movement of the observation. This means that the agent must continuously adjust its behavior in order to succeed in the achievement of its motivators, especially in uncertain and dynamic environments. Figure 2 .b shows a possible trajectory resulting from the adjustment of agent's behavior by switching to a different achiever. This second achiever can be a new option or a refinement of the previous achiever through a planning process. Independently of the specific processes that generated the new achiever, the forces that led to that change underlie all the cognitive dynamics of the agent. In the agent flow model the emotional phenomena are considered the expression of those forces, which can be characterized as emotional dispositions, as presented before.
In the cognitive space, the cognitive dynamics can be described by the movements of cognitive elements, and the associated emotional dispositions defined by the evolution of the distance s and velocity v relative to the motivators. That is: These emotional disposition tendencies are behavioral forces that constrain the cognitive processes of an agent. Therefore, the dynamics resulting from these forces are, at the same time, a result of the cognitive activity and a constraint that influences it, reflecting the symbiotic relation between emotion and cognition, as we proposed initially.
ADAPTIVE REASONING MECHANISMS
The proposed model provides a generic framework for the implementation of agents of different types and levels of complexity. For instance, simple agents have a predetermined cognitive structure and very simple cognitive processes. Their behavior is directly guided by the dynamics resulting from the cognitive potentials and flows [18] , leading to basic adaptive behavior such as the kineses of some organisms (e.g. bacterial chemotaxis) [29] . However, the relation between emotional and cognitive phenomena becomes particularly relevant when we consider high-level cognitive processing, such as reasoning and decision-making, as experimental evidence indicates [6] .
In the proposed model, the relation between emotional and cognitive phenomena is expressed in two ways: by modulating the changes in the cognitive structure due to past experiences (i.e. the formation of emotional memories) [19] and by regulating the cognitive activity due to the present achievement conditions. Next we will address this second aspect, that is, how do the emotion-based mechanisms support the adaptation of cognitive activity in order to achieve effective behavior under resource bounded conditions. (8), between an observation and some motivator. In addition, the emotional disposition components δs and δv (7) 
Emotional Disposition Mechanisms
where proj(x, y) denotes the projection of vector x over vector y.
Together with the cognitive potentials p s and p v , the λ + and λ -signals are the main sources for the regulation of agents' cognitive activity, as will be discussed in the next section.
Focusing Mechanisms
The focusing mechanisms enable the adaptation of the type and rate of cognitive activity according to the achievement conditions, in order to make the best use of resources that are limited. We refer achievement conditions and not environmental conditions because this adaptation must be relative to what is relevant to the achievement of the agent motivators. This adaptation involves focusing cognitive processes along two perspectives: (i) a spatial perspective that refers to the space of cognitive elements over which processing can occur; and (ii) a temporal perspective that refers to the time available for cognitive processing. Focusing cognitive processes along both of these perspectives is a key issue in the implementation of autonomous agents able to handle the real-time requirements and resource bounded conditions typical of real-world domains.
In the proposed model, these two perspectives of adaptation correspond to two main mechanisms, the attention focusing mechanism and the temporal focusing mechanism. Both of them depend on the signals produced by the emotional disposition mechanisms to operate, as previously referred. Figure 4 illustrates how these different mechanisms are interconnected. The affective signals λ + and λ -, produced by the emotional disposition mechanisms, are directly input to both focusing mechanisms. On the other hand, the p s and p v cognitive potentials get integrated with the pair of cognitive elements that originated them, an observation and a motivator, constituting a composite cognitive element with an emotional disposition content. It is these composite cognitive elements that will be subject to attention focusing and possibly included in the attention field.
Attention Focusing
The attention focusing mechanism restricts the attention of the cognitive processes to specific cognitive elements according to their emotional disposition content (i.e. p s and p v cognitive potentials). This mechanism acts like a depletion barrier, producing an attention field formed by the cognitive elements able to bypass the barrier. Only the elements in the attention field are considered by the high-level cognitive processes, such as reasoning and deliberation.
The depletion barrier is characterized by a depletion intensity and by a permeability. The depletion intensity ε, is regulated by the affective signals λ + and λ -, expressing their cumulative effect. That is: (10) where the sensitivity coefficients α + and α − determine the influence of λ + and λ -signals, respectively. In this way the intensity of the depletion barrier reflects the prevailing affective character and not the instantaneous values resulting from isolated experiences.
The permeability µ determines the intensity ε σ of the interaction between a cognitive element σ and the depletion barrier, defined as:
where µ s and µ v are the permeability coefficients that determine the influence of p s and p v cognitive potentials.
Given a certain depletion intensity ε, a cognitive element σ bypasses the barrier and is included in the attention field if ε σ >ε.
Temporal Focusing
The temporal focusing mechanism regulates the rate of cognitive activity by providing a time-base for overall cognitive processing.
This time-base corresponds to a signal p φ with frequency ω φ , which determines a period for cognitive processing. That is, it determines the time available before some behavior must be produced.
The regulation of the frequency ω φ is determined by the affective signals λ + and λ -. Like in the attention mechanism, sensitivity coefficients β + and β − determine the influence of λ + and λ -signals. In the same way, the frequency ω φ expresses the cumulative effect of λ + and λ -signals in order to reflect the prevailing affective character of the achievement conditions. That is:
By regulating the rate of cognitive activity, the temporal focusing mechanism has a direct influence on the balance between the use of computational resources and solution quality. For instance, it allows taking advantage of partial planning, anytime algorithms or other types of bounded reasoning mechanisms (e.g. [2, 7] ).
Notice that the effect of the temporal focusing mechanism extends beyond what can be explored in this paper, since it can also have an influence on perception, action and memory formation.
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
It is the combined operation of all the above described mechanisms that produces the adaptive properties enabling effective behavior under dynamic resource bounded conditions. To illustrate that, we will consider a specific scenario where reasoning under time-limited conditions in a dynamic environment is required.
Experimental Framework
The experimental framework is an implementation of the Tileworld domain, a well-known scenario for studying agents' effectiveness in that type of conditions. Our implementation follows the specification of this scenario as presented in [11] , which is a reference specification also adopted by Schut, Wooldridge and Parsons in [25] .
The Tileworld is a 2-dimensional grid on which an agent scores points by moving to targets, known as holes. When the agent reaches a hole, the hole is filled and disappears. Holes appear in specific instants, in randomly selected empty squares, and exist for a length of time. Both holes' gestation time and life expectancy are taken from given independent random distributions. The task of the agent is to visit holes in order to gain as many points as possible.
Two parameters control the experiments: the dynamism of the environment (γ), as perceived by the agent, denoted by an integer in the range 1 to 100, representing the ratio between the world clock rate and the agent clock rate; the planning cost, representing the number of time-steps required to form a plan. Kinny and Georgeff [11] compared different commitment reconsideration policies for fixed planning costs 0, 1, 2 and 4, without considering the actual cost of each generated plan. In our case, in order to evaluate the effect of the focusing mechanisms, especially the temporal focusing mechanism, it is important to take into account the actual planning cost. Therefore, in our implementation the planning cost is not fixed, rather it is proportional to the dimension of the search tree explored during plan formation. Partial planning is also considered, since the planning process can be interrupted due to temporal focusing. The planning process is based upon a state space A* planner.
In our implementation, each hole perceived by the agent is modeled as a motivator and the current position of the agent is modeled as an observation. As in Kinny and Georgeff's implementation, agents only generate plans for visiting a single hole, rather than planning multiple-hole tours.
The attention field, produced by the attention focusing mechanism, constrains the set of motivators (holes) over which deliberation will occur. Indirectly, the attention field also guides the reconsideration of intentions, namely affecting the choice of the motivator that the agent will try to reach, that is, the selection of the current intention. It also controls the switch between planning and action activities. While the motivator corresponding to the current intention remains in the attention field, no reconsideration will occur and action is activated according to the previously determined plan. Otherwise, the motivator closest to the agent position is selected as the next current intention and planning is activated.
The switch between planning and acting is also determined by the temporal focusing mechanism. If during the activation of planning a period of cognitive activity ends, planning is interrupted, the best partial plan found so far is considered, and the first planned action is executed.
Results and Analysis
A set of experiments will be reported concerning the isolated and combined operation of the attention focusing and temporal focusing mechanisms. The permeability and sensitivity coefficients of these mechanisms were considered fixed parameters of the implementation. In each experiment the dynamism γ was varied. The results presented for a given dynamism value are the average over 100 runs of 20000 timesteps per run.
Two dependent variables were measured: (i) the effectiveness of the agent, defined as the ratio of the actual score achieved by the agent to the maximum score that could in principle have been achieved; and (ii) the total planning cost, defined as the sum of the planning costs for all plans generated during a run.
To provide a reference point for comparison of the results produced with our approach, we also implemented a purely deliberative agent following the Schut, Wooldridge and Parsons's (SWP) best reconsideration policy (from [25] ). This policy lets the agent deliberate when a hole appears that is closer than the intended hole (but not on the path to the intended hole), and when the intended hole disappears. This policy improves the best policy presented by Kinny and Georgeff [11] . Figures 5 and 6 show the results obtained from the different experiments concerning 4 agents: the SWP agent and 3 agents corresponding to different configurations of our agent architecture. The following configurations were tested: ATF agent, with both focusing mechanisms enabled; AF agent with only the attention focusing mechanism enabled; and TF agent, with only the temporal focusing mechanism enabled. As can be observed in figure 5 , the effectiveness results for the AF agent are better than the results of the reference SWP agent, particularly for low to medium values of dynamism. For the TF agent the results are also better, except for low values of dynamism (log 10 (γ) < 0.8). In the case of the ATF agent (both attention focusing and temporal focusing enabled) there is consistent improvement through the whole range of dynamism values.
These results can be explained by the combined operation of emotional disposition and focusing mechanisms. The emotional disposition mechanisms provide the base support for deciding when to change the current intention by modulating the cognitive elements relevance. For instance, when a new hole appears a strong favorable emotional disposition is produced enabling the corresponding motivator to enter the attention field. In addition, the affective signals that are generated regulate the attention and temporal focusing. For instance, when the dynamism is low to medium, an agent has time to fill most of the holes that appear, and so a positive affective character prevails, which results in a low depletion intensity. Therefore, most of the motivators are present in the attention field, including the current intention. In this way, while the SWP agent reconsiders every time a hole appears that is closer than the intended hole, except if it is on the path to the intended hole, our AF and ATF agents will rarely reconsider. This reduces planning time consumption (planning cost), as shown in figure 6 , increasing the time available for acting. The overall result is an improved effectiveness. On the other hand, when the dynamism is high, agents don't have time to fill most of the holes, and so a negative affective character prevails, which results in a high depletion intensity and a short cognitive processing period. Due to the high depletion intensity, only the motivators corresponding to new holes are able to enter the attention field and our AF and ATF agents will reconsider more often. If only attention focusing is enabled (AF agent) the overall behavior converges to the behavior of the SWP agent, as shown in figure 5 . However, when temporal focusing is enabled the decrease of the cognitive processing period leads to the restriction of planning time even when an agent selects a new intention, therefore increasing the responsiveness of the agent to the fast changing conditions, leading to an increase in the effectiveness of the TF and ATF agents. In these conditions the effects of temporal focusing become predominant, as shown by the TF curve in figure 5 . In figure 6 , it is possible to observe that these agents are able to regulate the time spent planning according to the achievement conditions, which is a clearly adaptive behavior.
These results show that it is possible to use emotion-based mechanisms to control reasoning processes, producing effects similar to (or even better than) those obtained with meta-level reasoning, at least for the Tileworld scenario.
DISCUSSION
The relationship between emotion, reasoning and decisionmaking has been an active area of research [10] , in particular after relevant theoretical and experimental work (e.g. [6, 13] ) presented concrete evidence of this relationship. However, the focus of the work concerning emotions in intelligent agents has been on modeling and implementing emotional aspects and not much in combining emotion and cognition.
In this area, one main line of research has been on appraisal theory based models (e.g. [22] ). Appraisal theories emphasize the structural aspects of emotion elicitation, but don't say much about the underlying processes [28] . On the other hand, the aspects of adaptation and learning, which are directly related to emotion, as experimental studies show [13] are not addressed.
A complementary line of research addresses these limitations by adopting a "design-based" approach (e.g. [27] ) where emotional mechanisms are embedded within an overall architecture in a resource bounded agent. Although this approach explicitly addresses the problem of integrating emotion and cognition for intelligent behavior under resource bounded conditions, a sharp line is drawn between cognitive and emotional processing, where emotion plays essentially an interruptive role [20, 26] .
Our proposal departs from these approaches by modeling emotion and cognition as two symbiotically integrated aspects of agent cognitive activity. This means that the relation between emotion and cognition occurs not only at a functional specialization level. Instead it is intrinsic to all cognitive activity and to the nature of the involved cognitive elements. Recent experimental results support this view, indicating that in humans, emotion and higher cognition can be truly integrated, that is, at some point of processing, functional specialization is lost and emotional and cognitive influences inseparable [9] .
On the other hand, two important aspects characterize emotional phenomena, the relation with adaptive behavior and the relation with reasoning and decision-making. This two-sided relation has remained almost unexplored in cognitive models due to the strong emphasis on functional division, which hinders the intrinsic relation of emotion and cognition as a whole. However, as some authors have proposed (e.g. [4] ), it is a fundamental aspect that enables effective intelligent behavior in concrete environments. This relation between adaptive behavior, emotion and high level cognitive processes is a main characteristic of the proposed model, enabling the adaptation to uncertain and dynamic environments and allowing the control of the high level cognitive processes.
Future research will aim at further refining the integration of emotional and cognitive aspects in planning processes, and to study related aspects such as the dynamical stability of the cognitive processes under the influence of multiple motivators.
